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Wer hat Schuld an Krieg und Kriegsverbrechen? Wie konnte es in einem zivilisierten Land soweit kommen? Mit Plakaten und Filmen, die Bilder aus den. Die Schrift Die Schuldfrage erschien erstmals und fasst die Überlegungen zusammen, die Jaspers in einer vielbesuchten Vorlesung im Wintersemester. Sie versuchte die Schuldfrage wissenschaftlich zu klären und wollte die Schuldanteile und Völkerrechtsverletzungen von einem Schiedsgericht untersuchen. llll➤ Der große Unfall-Ratgeber zur "Schuldfrage", z.B. wie die Schuldfrage beim Autounfall geklärt wird, wie die Versicherung reagiert uvm. Definition, Rechtschreibung, Synonyme und Grammatik von 'Schuldfrage' auf Duden online nachschlagen. Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache.
Sie versuchte die Schuldfrage wissenschaftlich zu klären und wollte die Schuldanteile und Völkerrechtsverletzungen von einem Schiedsgericht untersuchen. Schuldfrage: Was bedeutet Schuld? Umgang mit Fehlern im Arbeitsalltag; Verantwortung für das eigene Handeln übernehmen; Statt Klärung der. Schuldfrage – Schreibung, Definition, Bedeutung, Synonyme, Beispiele im DWDS. der Schuldfrage. die Schuldfrage aufwerfen, erörtern, klären. Schuld·frage.
The director of the psychiatric clinic of the university of Heidelberg, Franz Nissl, permitted him to spend the majority of his time at the library rather than in the clinic and the laboratory.
Indeed, his extraordinary skills of critical thinking and abstract observation on human situations were evident already then. From onward, Jaspers read philosophy systematically.
In he published his Allgemeine Psychopathologie General Psychopathology which already made apparent the viewpoints and methods that belong to the world of the humanities and social studies that were regarded by him as converging into psychopathology.
In the same year, he obtained his second doctorate Habilitation in psychology from the Philosophy Faculty at the University of Heidelberg, supervised by Wilhelm Windelband.
He was a lecturer and later an Associate Professor of Psychology Privatdozent from to During this period, in , he published his Psychologie der Weltanschauungen Psychology of World Views.
This work is considered as a transitional work, in which his psychological method was clearly shaped by philosophical influences and objectives, and was already evolving into a consistent philosophical doctrine and acquiring some of the main issues that were to be explored later within his philosophy of existence.
Then, in , he took over the full professorial chair of philosophy in the University of Heidelberg after Heinrich Maier , a position from which he was dismissed in by the Nazis.
To a large extent, the two first major publications were works of psychology that contain many elements, albeit in inchoate form, of his later philosophy.
Following his nomination as professor, he wrote nothing for ten years, except for two small works—a patholography Stirnberg and van Gogh in and Die Idee der Universität The Idea of the University in His intellectual formation was marked in a number of ways by this intellectual milieu.
This period witnessed the dethroning of neo-Kantianism as the philosophical orthodoxy in the German academic establishment, and it was marked by a proliferation of philosophical models which rejected Kantian formalism and sought to integrate experiential, historical and even sociological elements into philosophical discourse.
His early career as professor of philosophy was also deeply and adversely affected by neo-Kantian hostility to his work.
Indeed, both neo-Kantians and phenomenological philosophers subjected his work to trenchant criticism in the early stages of his philosophical trajectory, and members of both these camps, especially Rickert and Edmund Husserl, accused him of importing anthropological and experiential questions into philosophy and thus of contaminating philosophical analysis with contents properly pertaining to other disciplines.
If Weber was the first decisive personal influence and Kant was the first decisive philosophical influence on Jaspers, in the early s he encountered a further figure who assumed a decisive role in his formation: that is, Martin Heidegger.
Throughout their theoretical trajectories, the differences between Heidegger and Jaspers were in many ways greater than the similarities.
In , Jaspers himself was briefly tempted into making certain incautiously optimistic statements about the Hitler regime. Indeed, these were remarks were not entirely out of keeping with his other publications of the early s.
In the last years of the Weimar Republic he published a controversial political work, Die geistige Situation der Zeit The Spiritual Condition of the Age , , which—to his later acute embarrassment—contained a carefully worded critique of parliamentary democracy.
Throughout this period, he also stressed the relevance of Weberian ideas of strong leadership for the preservation of political order in Germany.
The souring of his relations with Heidegger, however, seems to have hardened his mind into a strict and sustained opposition to National Socialism, and, unlike Heidegger, his works of the s avoided political themes and were largely concentrated on elaborating the interior or religious aspects of his philosophy.
In , he published his trilogy Philosophie , consisting of three separate volumes, each based on its own object of transcending: Weltorientierung Orientation of the World , Existenzerhellung Illumination of Existence and Metaphysik Metaphysics.
This book is generally considered as his magnum opus and he testified in retrospect that is was the closest work to his heart.
Despite the at times envenomed relations between them, however, Heidegger and Jaspers are usually associated with each other as the two founding fathers of existential philosophy in Germany.
This interpretation of their philosophical status and relationship is at least questionable. Heidegger resented being described as an existentialist, and Jaspers, at least after , resented being identified with Heidegger.
Nonetheless, there remains a residue of validity in the common association of Heidegger and Jaspers, and, although it requires qualification, this association is not in every respect misleading.
Existentialism was, and remains, a highly diffuse theoretical movement, and it cannot be expected that two philosophers connected with this movement should hold similar views in all respects.
However, existentialism had certain unifying features, and many of these were common to both Jaspers and Heidegger. If this definition of existentialism is accepted, then the suggestion of a family connection between Jaspers and Heidegger cannot be entirely repudiated, for both contributed to the reorganization of philosophical questioning in the s in a manner which conforms to this definition.
During the Nazi period from onwards, Jaspers was excluded from any co-operation in the administration of the university until he was dismissed from his chair as a professor in and was subject to a publication ban Publikationsverbot.
During the war, he and his wife were in no physical danger. Yet he felt himself a marked man until the end of World War II. Jaspers once heard indirectly that there was a plan to deport him and his wife to a concentration camp in the middle of April Fortunately, the American troops arrived in Heidelberg two weeks earlier, on April 1 st However, after , his fortunes changed dramatically, and he figured prominently on the White List of the US-American occupying forces: that is, on the list of politicians and intellectuals who were deemed untarnished by any association with the NSDAP, and who were allowed to play a public role in the process of German political re-foundation.
From this time on Jaspers defined himself primarily as a popular philosopher and educator. In the first role, he contributed extensive edifying commentaries on questions of political orientation and civic morality—first, in the interim state of —, and then, after , in the early years of the Federal Republic of Germany.
In the second role, as one of the professors responsible for reopening the University of Heidelberg, to which he was appointed by the American Army of Occupation as a contemporary rector, he wrote at length on the necessity of university reforms, he emphasized the role of liberal humanistic education as a means of disseminating democratic ideas throughout Germany, and he took a firm line against the rehabilitation of professors with a history of Nazi affiliation.
In , The Idea of the University was published in an essentially different form from the book with the same title from The later work presents the university as a free community of scholars and students engaged in the task of seeking truth.
As such, the university and the scholars that populate it can and should play a decisive role in rehabilitation of Europe based on the noblest ideas of the enlightenment.
At that time and still, Jaspers is one of few who can justly speak for value and the need for such a stance against the threats upon freedom and humanity.
His contribution to the promotion of a democratic civic culture in West Germany at this time was of great importance, and his writings and radio broadcasts shaped, in part, the gradually evolving democratic consensus of the early Federal Republic.
In Die Schuldfrage The Question of German Guilt , , published at the time of the Nürnberg trials, he argued that, although not all Germans could be legitimately brought to trial for war crimes, all Germans should accept an implicit complicity in the holocaust and only the critical self-reflection of all Germans could lead to cultural and political renewal.
In the s, he supported the main policies of the liberal-conservative governments led by Konrad Adenauer — , and he particularly endorsed the formation of the Western Alliance, which he saw as a means of protecting the cultural resources of Western European culture from their colonization by the Soviet Union.
In this respect, he can be viewed as an important precursor of Jürgen Habermas, and his works contain an early conception of the doctrine later known as constitutional patriotism.
His views on German re-unification were also particularly influential; he opposed the dominant outlooks of the time by claiming that the demand for re-unification meant that German politics remained infected with the damaging traces of old geo-political ideas and ambitions, and it prevented the fundamental redirection of German political life.
Finally, then, in symbolic demonstration of disgust at the persistence of pernicious political attitudes in Germany he relinquished his German citizenship, and, having earlier moved across the border to University of Basel in , he became a Swiss national.
In his last works, he placed himself closer to the political left, and he even argued that only a legal revolution could ensure that the German state was organized on the basis of a morally decisive constitution.
He died of a stroke in Basel, Switzerland on February 26 at the age of His wife, Gertrud Jaspers, who served as his amanuensis throughout his entire life as a scholar, died in Basel on May 25 at the age of As a young man, he authored a number of scientific articles on homesickness and crime, on intelligence tests, on hallucinations — all illustrated with detailed case histories.
Also, Jaspers published reports of the mental pathology of Van Gogh and Stirnberg. At the age of barely thirty, in , while he was working as a physician in the psychiatric hospital at Heidelberg, Jaspers published his Allgemeine Psychopathologie: Ein Leitfaden für Studierenden, Ärzte und Psychologen General Psychopathology: A Guide for Students, Physicians and Psychologists.
The aims of this book were to provide the framework of the scientific field of psychopathology and its related facts and approaches, not only for practitioners in this filed but also for interested intellectuals.
This framework covers the problems and methods that capture the body of knowledge of the field rather than empirical evidence or a system based on a theory.
Instead of deciding between the different existing approaches of his time, he stressed their peculiarity that entails the inherent justifications and the way they might complement each other and together portray the many sides of the psychopathological science.
Just two years later, Jaspers moved away forever from psychiatric practice and medicine in general, first towards psychology and then philosophy.
Interestingly, though, Jaspers saw fit to revise and expand the text in a few of its several editions. The first edition is the shortest.
In the second and third editions, there were minor changes. The most considerably revised and expanded edition is the fourth, which appeared in To a large extent, the integration of many ideas from his then already mature existential philosophy from the thirties onwards, which more than doubled the scope of the text, in fact amount to a new version of the book.
Now, the subtitle that appeared in the earlier versions was removed and in the preface Jaspers indicates its high aim of satisfying the demand for knowledge, not only for physicians but for all who make mankind their theme.
In this enlarged version of the book, the imprint of Husserl's descriptive psychology is apparent in the attempt to address the inner mental experiences of mentally ill people mainly schizophrenic patients and regard them as indicative of the general phenomena of human consciousness, i.
Notwithstanding this, Jaspers opposed the attempts to address existentialist ideas for the sake of understanding mental illness.
For him it is not possible that a human being as a whole falls ill or alternatively that illness of any kind can cover one's entire being, rather there are always parts that remain uninfected with illness or healthy.
It is worth noting that the appearance of the fourth edition of General Psychopathology was enabled despite the publication ban to which Jaspers was subject since for his outspoken and uncompromising resistance to the Nazis regime and his persistent loyalty to his Jewish wife.
Probably the same title from and the scientific character, which covered the fact of incorporation of the of considerable sections which where imprinted with his philosophical thinking, were helpful in this regard.
Despite ceasing practicing psychiatry, Jaspers retain his interest in psychopathology and was fully aware of the developments in the field, in particular regarding the neurological and somatic aspects of mental illness.
However, after the fourth edition appeared, five more were printed in the same format as the fourth, the latest appearing in An English translation exists for the seventh edition only and was published in by J.
Hoenig and Miriam Hamilton. The underlying argument in this work is that the constitutive fact of human mental life is the division between subject and object Subjekt-Objekt-Spaltung.
Human psychological forms—or world views—are positioned as antinomical moments within this founding antinomy, and they give distinct paradigmatic expression to the relation between human subjective inclinations and freedoms and the objective phenomena which the subject encounters.
Unlike Weber, however, Jaspers argued that the construction of world views is not a merely neutral process, to be judged in non-evaluative manner.
Instead, all world views contain an element of pathology; they incorporate strategies of defensiveness, suppression and subterfuge, and they are concentrated around false certainties or spuriously objectivized modes of rationality, into which the human mind withdraws in order to obtain security amongst the frighteningly limitless possibilities of human existence.
World views, in consequence, commonly take the form of objectivized cages Gehäuse , in which existence hardens itself against contents and experiences which threaten to transcend or unbalance the defensive restrictions which it has placed upon its operations.
Although some world views possess an unconditioned component, most world views exist as the limits of a formed mental apparatus.
It is the task of psychological intervention, Jaspers thus argued, to guide human existence beyond the restricted antinomies around which it stabilizes itself, and to allow it decisively to confront the more authentic possibilities, of subjective and objective life, which it effaces through its normal rational dispositions and attitudes.
Most modes of rationality, he suggested, are conveniently instrumental or ideological forms, which serve distinct subjective and objective functions, and they habitually stand in the way of genuine knowledge.
At the same time, however, he also claimed that rationality possesses capacities of communicative integrity and phenomenological self-overcoming, and, if authentically exercised, it is able to escape its narrowly functional form, to expose itself to new contents beyond its limits and antinomies, and to elaborate new and more cognitively unified conceptual structures.
He therefore indicated that formal-epistemological concepts of rationality must be expanded to recognize that experience and committed actions are formative of authentic knowledge, and that reason cannot, in Cartesian manner, be monadically dislocated from its historical, sensory, experiential and voluntaristic foundations.
From the outset, therefore, Jaspers's work, although methodologically marked by Weber, was also indelibly stamped by Hegel's philosophy, and it sought to integrate the preconditions of Hegel's phenomenology into a systematic psychological doctrine.
In this, he transposed the dialectical process through which Hegel accounted for the overcoming of cognitive antinomies in the emergence of self-consciousness into an analysis of cognitive formation which sees the resolution of reason's antinomies as effected through vital experiences, decisive acts of self-confrontation, or communicative transcendence.
In this early work, Jaspers introduced several concepts which assumed great importance for all his work. Most importantly, this work contains a theory of the limit Grenze.
This term designates both the habitual forms and attitudes of the human mental apparatus, and the experiences of the mind as it recognizes these attitudes as falsely objectivized moments within its antinomical structure, and as it transcends these limits by disposing itself in new ways towards itself and its objects.
Limit situations are moments, usually accompanied by experiences of dread, guilt or acute anxiety, in which the human mind confronts the restrictions and pathological narrowness of its existing forms, and allows itself to abandon the securities of its limitedness, and so to enter new realm of self-consciousness.
In conjunction with this, then, this work also contains a theory of the unconditioned das Unbedingte. In this theory, Jaspers argued that limit situations are unconditioned moments of human existence, in which reason is drawn by intense impulses or imperatives, which impel it to expose itself to the limits of its consciousness and to seek higher or more reflected modes of knowledge.
The unconditioned, a term transported from Kantian doctrines of synthetic regress, is thus proposed by Jaspers as a vital impetus in reason, in which reason encounters its form as conditioned or limited and desires to transcend the limits of this form.
In this, he argued that the freedom of consciousness to overcome its limits and antinomies can only be elaborated through speech: that is, as a process in which consciousness is elevated beyond its limits through intensely engaged communication with other persons, and in which committed communication helps to suspend the prejudices and fixed attitudes of consciousness.
Existentially open consciousness is therefore always communicative, and it is only where it abandons its monological structure that consciousness can fully elaborate its existential possibilities.
In this early doctrine of communication, Jaspers helped to shape a wider communicative and intersubjective shift in German philosophy; indeed, the resonances of his existential hermeneutics remained palpable in the much later works of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur.
Less obviously, however, in this doctrine he also guided early existential thinking away from its original association with Kierkegaard and Nietzsche and, although assimilating Kierkegaardian elements of decisiveness and impassioned commitment, he claimed that Kierkegaard's cult of interiority, centred in the speechlessness of inner life, was a miscarried attempt to envision the conditions of human authenticity.
The decision for authentic self-overcoming and cognitive unity can only occur, he argued, through shared participation in dialogue.
In this work, he retained the partly Hegelian focus of his earlier publications, and he followed the spirit of Hegelian phenomenology in providing an account of the formation of human consciousness, which grasps consciousness as proceeding from the level of immediate knowledge and progressing through a sequence of antinomies towards a level of truthfully unified reflection and self-knowledge.
In this, Jaspers again accentuated the claim that the antinomies which reason encounters and resolves in its unfolding as truth are at once both cognitive and experiential antinomies, and that the lived moments of human existence are always of cognitively constitutive relevance for the formation of consciousness.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hoenig and Marian W. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Duden in German. Retrieved 22 October Archived from the original on 22 October Salem Press Biographical Encyclopedia.
Retrieved 30 January Max Weber: A Biography. Polity Press. Karl Jaspers". Stadt Oldenburg in German. Archived from the original on 23 October Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Off the Telly. Archived from the original on 23 November Retrieved 10 June The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers.
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Indeed, through his hermeneutical transformation of idealism into a metaphysics of symbolic interpretation, he might be seen, like both Schelling and Johann Georg Hamann before him, as a philosopher who was intent on re-invoking the truth of revelation, as an absolute and non-identical content of knowledge, against the rational evidences of epistemology, and so on elaborating an interpretive methodology adapted to a conception of truth as disclosed or revealed.
At one level, Jaspers was philosophically committed to a sympathetic retrieval of religious contents. He was insistent that truth can only be interpreted as an element of radical alterity in reason, or as reason's experience of its own limits.
Similarly, he was insistent that the conditions of human freedom are not generated by human reason alone, but are experienced as incursions of transcendence in rational thought.
For these reasons, his philosophy is sympathetic towards the primary implications of revelation theology, and it cautiously upholds the essential philosophical claim of revelation: namely, that truth is a disclosure of otherness transcendence to reason, or at least an interpreted moment of otherness in reason.
At the same time, however, Jaspers cannot in any obvious way be described as a religious philosopher. In fact, he was very critical of revelation theology, and of orthodox religions more generally, on a number of quite separate counts.
First, he argued that the centre of religion is always formed by a falsely objectivized or absolutized claim to truth, which fails to recognize that transcendence occurs in many ways, and that transcendent truths cannot be made concrete as a set of factual statements or narratives.
Religious world views are therefore examples of limited mental attitudes, which seek a hold in uniform doctrine in order to evade a confrontation with the uncertainty and instability of transcendence.
In positing transcendence as a realized element of revelation, religion in fact obstructs the capacity for transcendence which all people possess; religion claims to offer transcendence, but it actually obstructs it.
Second, then, as the foundations of dogma and doctrinal orthodoxy, revealed truth-claims eliminate the self-critical and communicative aspect of human reason, and they undermine the dialogical preconditions of transcendence and existential self-knowledge.
Jaspers thus viewed orthodox religion as an obstruction to communication, which places dogmatic limits on the common human capacity for truthfulness and transcendence.
Nonetheless, as a philosopher of transcendence, he was also clear that human truthfulness, or humanity more generally, cannot be conceived without a recuperation of religious interpretive approaches and without a recognition of the fact that the founding contents of philosophy are transcendent.
Much of his work, in consequence, might be construed as an attempt to free the contents of religious thinking from the dogmatic orthodoxies imposed upon these contents in the name of organized religion.
This notoriously difficult concept contains a number of quite distinct meanings. First, it means that true philosophy must be guided by a faith in the originary transcendence of human existence, and that philosophy which negatively excludes or ignores its transcendent origin falls short of the highest tasks of philosophy.
Second, however, it also means that true philosophy cannot simply abandon philosophical rationality for positively disclosed truth-contents or dogma, and that the critical function of rationality has a constitutive role in the formation of absolute knowledge.
In this respect, Jaspers revisited some of the controversies concerning the relation between religion and philosophy which shaped the philosophy of the Young Hegelians in the s.
Like the Young Hegelians, he insisted that faith needs philosophy, and faith devalues its contents wherever these are dogmatically or positively proclaimed.
Third, then, this concept also indicates that the evidences of faith are always paradoxical and uncertain and that those who pursue knowledge of these contents must accept an attitude of philosophical relativism and discursive exchange: if faith results in dogmatism, it immediately undermines its claims to offer transcendent knowledge.
The concept of philosophical faith is thus proposed, not as a doctrine of factual revelation or accomplished transcendence, but as a guide to transcendent communication, which balances the element of disclosure in faith with a critical philosophical veto on the absolutism of religious claims, and which consequently insists that transcendent knowledge must be accepted as relative and incomplete.
In this regard, Jaspers held the religious aspects of his philosophy on a fine dialectic between theological and anthropological assertions.
He implied, at one level, that purely secularist accounts of human life occlude existence against its originary transcendent possibilities and freedoms.
At the same time, however, he also suggested that pure theological analysis closes humanity against the relativity and precariousness of its truths, and against the communicative processes through which these truths are disclosed.
Only philosophy which can at once embrace and relativize secularism and embrace and relativize religion is able to undertake adequate existential inquiry, and philosophy which, in either direction, abandons the dialectical edge between these two commitments ceases to be genuine philosophy.
This critical-recuperative attitude towards religious inquiry was fundamental to many of the public controversies in which Jaspers engaged.
The religious elements of his work came under attack from the Calvinist theologian, Karl Barth, who denounced the lack of objective religious content in his concept of transcendence.
More significantly, though, Jaspers also entered into a lengthy and influential controversy with Rudolf Bultmann, the resonances of which still impact on liberal theological debate.
At the time when Bultmann first proposed this de-mythologizing approach Jaspers was widely although erroneously identified with the liberal wing of Protestant theology, and it was perhaps expected that he might declare sympathy for Bultmann's hermeneutical approach.
Jaspers, however, turned sharply on Bultmann. In opposition to Bultmann, therefore, Jaspers concluded that only a religious hermeneutic based in absolute liberality , excluding all orthodoxy, could be appropriate to the task of interpreting the transcendent contents of human life.
Interpretive methods which efface the traces of historical contingency from transcendence and reduce transcendence to one predetermined religious truth, he suggested, fail to reflect on the plural and various forms in which transcendence can be interpreted, they erroneously presuppose that transcendence can be encased in the categories of one exclusive doctrine, and they undervalue the constitutive historical variability of transcendence.
As a consequence, Jaspers argued implicitly for the importance of mythical or symbolic forms in religious inquiry, and he indicated that both myth and religion contain, in similar measure, the interpreted residues of transcendence.
His analysis of religion culminated in a discussion of Trinitarian theology which, echoing Ludwig Feuerbach's anthropological analysis, asserted that the three parts of the trinity should be interpreted, not as factual elements of deity, but as symbolic ciphers of human possibility.
In this, he ascribed particular significance to the second person of the Trinity, Jesus Christ, as a cipher for the human existential possibility of inner change, reversal and transformation.
Wherever this cipher is hypostatically defined as mere positive fact of belief, he concluded however, the freedom of transcendence obtained through the sympathetic interpretation and recuperation of this cipher is obstructed.
Indeed, the ambition behind his work on religion and myth was no less than to liberate transcendence from theology, and to permit an interpretive transformation of religiously conceived essences into the free moments of human self-interpretation.
If his thought can truly be placed in the terrain of theological discourse, therefore, his approach to religion is one of extreme liberalism and latitudinarianism, which dismisses the claim that transcendence is exclusively or even predominantly disclosed by religion.
The truth of religion, he intimated, only becomes true if it is interpreted as a human truth, not as a truth originally external or prior to humanity.
In its orthodox form, however, religion normally prevents the knowledge of transcendence which it purports to offer. In fact, his criticism of religious dogmatism evolved in conjunction with a wider doctrine of humanism, which ultimately became the defining component of his later work.
Arguably, Jaspers was always a humanist; certainly, if humanism is defined as a doctrine which seeks to account for the specificity, uniqueness and dignity of human life his work can, from the outset, be seen as a variant on philosophical humanism.
The argument runs through all his early works that human beings are distinguished by the fact that they have authentic attributes of existence and transcendence—that is, by their ability to raise questions about themselves and their freedoms which cannot be posed in material or scientific terms, and by their resultant capacity for decisive reversal, self-transformation and transcendence.
True humanity is thus a condition of free self-possession and transcendent authenticity. In general terms, existentialism can be divided between philosophers, such as Jean-Paul Sartre, who defined existentialism as a humanism, and those, such as Heidegger, who saw the organization of philosophy around the analysis of human determinacy as a metaphysical corruption of philosophy.
Jaspers clearly belonged to the first category of existential philosophers. From this time on, moreover, he attached greater importance to the social and collective conditions of human integrity and he tended to tone down his earlier construction of interiority as the place of human freedom.
In fact, even the term Existenz became increasingly scarce in his post publications, and it was replaced, to a large extent, by ideas of shared humanity, founded, not in the decisive experiences of inner transformation, but in the resources of culture, tradition and ethically modulated political life.
Central to these later works, consequently, was not only a turn towards humanistic reflection, but also an inquiry into the politics of humanism and the distinctively human preconditions of political existence.
Broadly reconstructed, in his later political work he argued that the emergence of European totalitarianism—exemplified by both National Socialism and Communism—was the result of a decline in political humanity and of an increasing primacy of modes of technical or instrumental rationality, which erode the authentic resources of human life.
He therefore sought to offer an account of a human polity, able to provide an enduring bastion against totalitarian inhumanity.
First, he argued, the human polity must be sustained by an integral cultural tradition, so that human beings can interpret the ciphers of their integrity in the ethical contents of a national culture.
The political betrayal of humanity, he suggested, is usually flanked by, and in fact presupposes, a cultural betrayal of humanity, and totalitarian governance normally arises from the erosion or instrumental subjection of culture.
In the nineteenth century Marx had argued that the reactionary malaise of German politics was caused by the fact that German society habitually allowed culture to stand in for politics and defined the relatively de-politicized educated bourgeois elite [ Bildungsbürgertum ] as the pillar of social order and the arbiter of progress.
Jaspers responded to this characterization of Germany by claiming that societies which undermine the cultural role of the bourgeois elite are inherently unstable, and that the educated bourgeoisie has a primary role to play in upholding the preconditions of democratic culture.
Second, he argued that the human polity must be based in free communication between citizens: communicative freedom is a prerequisite of public virtue.
The human polity, he thus implied, is likely to be some kind of democracy, based in some degree of publicly formed consensus. Like Arendt, in fact, he concluded that social atomization creates cultures in which totalitarianism is likely to flourish, and that only unregulated debate in the public sphere can offset this latent pathology of mass society.
Third, he argued that the resources of technological, scientific and economic planning employed by the political system should be kept at a minimum, and that the existence of an unplanned sphere of human interaction is necessary for the maintenance of a human political order.
In this respect, he fervently opposed all tendencies towards technocratic governance, which he identified both in the Communist bloc in Eastern Europe, and in the rapidly expanding welfare state of the Federal Republic under Adenauer.
Technocracy, he asserted, is the objective form of the instrumental tendencies in human reason, and if it is not counterbalanced by the integrally human resources of cultural or rational communication it is likely to result in oppressive government.
In this respect, he moved close to quite standard variants on political liberalism, and he endorsed limited government, relative cultural and economic freedom, and protection for society from unaccountable political direction.
Fourth, he also argued that a human polity requires a constitutional apparatus, enshrining basic rights, imposing moral-legal order on the operations of the state, and restricting the prerogative powers of the political apparatus.
Like Kant, therefore, he advocated the institution of an international federation of states, with shared constitutions, laws and international courts.
Fifth, however, he also retained aspects of the elite-democratic outlook which he had first inherited from Weber, and he continued to argue that the human polity must be supported and guided by reasonable persons or responsible elites.
Even in his last writings of the s, in which he declared tentative support for the activities of the student movement around , there remain traces of elite-democratic sympathy.
For all his importance in modern German politics, therefore, his philosophy of politics was always slightly anachronistic, and his position remained embedded in the personalistic ideals of statehood which characterized the old-liberal political culture of Imperial Germany and persisted in the conservative-liberal fringes of the Weimar Republic.
This is a monumental project of universal history of philosophy, whose creators were the outstanding philosophers who inspired the human thought.
The first two volumes of this work appeared in , while the third and fourth have been gathered from the vast material of his posthumous papers.
The English translations were by Ralf Manheim and edited by Hannah Arendt, and appeared in parts until The planned project consists of three major divisions, altogether comprising 50 volumes: works I.
The work on this edition at the Universities of Heidelberg and Oldenburg is projected to take 18 years and is the fruit of cooperation with the Karl Jaspers Foundation in Basel.
The editors will have recourse to the unpublished writings kept at the German Literary Archives in Marbach and the 11, volumes of the Jaspers Research Library in the future Karl Jaspers House in Oldenburg.
Over and above the commentary itself, the edition is designed to provide new impulses for research on the philosopher and to enable the debates on present-day cultural and political issues to profit from a species of thinking that can be described as interdisciplinary and cosmopolitan in the best sense of those terms.
For now, the following volumes exist:. ISBN XXXII, pp. Leinen mit Schutzumschlag. XC, pp. ISBN In production. L, pp. Biography 2. Career 3.
Early Psychiatric Writings 4. The Philosophical Writings 5. Philosophy and Religion 6. Later Works: The Politics of Humanism 7.
Career Jaspers received an extremely diverse and broad-ranging education. In Archiv für Kriminal-Anthropologie und Kriminalistik , Translated as The Idea of the University , trans.
Reiche and H. Vanderschmidt, Boston: Beacon Press, Translated as Man in the Modern Age , trans.
Paul and C. Paul, London: Routledge, Translated as Philosophy , trans. Ashton, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, — Translated as Reason and Existenz , trans.
Earle, New York: Noonday Press, Wallraff and F. Schmitz, Tucson: University of Arizona Press, Jaspers' dissatisfaction with the popular understanding of mental illness led him to question both the diagnostic criteria and the methods of clinical psychiatry.
He published a paper in in which he addressed the problem of whether paranoia was an aspect of personality or the result of biological changes.
Although it did not broach new ideas, this article introduced a rather unusual method of study, at least according to the norms then prevalent.
Not unlike Freud , Jaspers studied patients in detail, giving biographical information about the patients as well as notes on how the patients themselves felt about their symptoms.
This has become known as the biographical method and now forms a mainstay of psychiatric and above all psychotherapeutic practice.
Jaspers set down his views on mental illness in a book which he published in , General Psychopathology.
One of Jaspers' central tenets was that psychiatrists should diagnose symptoms of mental illness particularly of psychosis by their form rather than by their content.
For example, in diagnosing a hallucination , it is more important to note that a person experiences visual phenomena when no sensory stimuli account for them, than to note what the patient sees.
What the patient sees is the "content", but the discrepancy between visual perception and objective reality is the "form".
Jaspers thought that psychiatrists could diagnose delusions in the same way. He argued that clinicians should not consider a belief delusional based on the content of the belief, but only based on the way in which a patient holds such a belief.
See delusion for further discussion. Jaspers also distinguished between primary and secondary delusions. He defined primary delusions as autochthonous , meaning that they arise without apparent cause, appearing incomprehensible in terms of a normal mental process.
This is a slightly different use of the word autochthonous than the ordinary medical or sociological use as a synonym for indigenous.
Secondary delusions, on the other hand, he defined as those influenced by the person's background, current situation or mental state.
Jaspers considered primary delusions to be ultimately "un-understandable", since he believed no coherent reasoning process existed behind their formation.
This view has caused some controversy, and the likes of R. Laing and Richard Bentall , p. For instance Huub Engels argues that schizophrenic disordered speech may be understandable, just as Emil Kraepelin 's dream speech is understandable.
Most commentators associate Jaspers with the philosophy of existentialism , in part because he draws largely upon the existentialist roots of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard , and in part because the theme of individual freedom permeates his work.
In Philosophy 3 vols, , Jaspers gave his view of the history of philosophy and introduced his major themes.
Beginning with modern science and empiricism , Jaspers points out that as we question reality , we confront borders that an empirical or scientific method simply cannot transcend.
At this point, the individual faces a choice: sink into despair and resignation, or take a leap of faith toward what Jaspers calls Transcendence.
In making this leap, individuals confront their own limitless freedom , which Jaspers calls Existenz , and can finally experience authentic existence.
Transcendence paired with the term The Encompassing in later works is, for Jaspers, that which exists beyond the world of time and space.
Jaspers' formulation of Transcendence as ultimate non-objectivity or no-thing-ness has led many philosophers to argue that ultimately, Jaspers became a monist , though Jaspers himself continually stressed the necessity of recognizing the validity of the concepts both of subjectivity and of objectivity.
Although he rejected explicit religious doctrines,  including the notion of a personal God, Jaspers influenced contemporary theology through his philosophy of transcendence and the limits of human experience.
Mystic Christian traditions influenced Jaspers himself tremendously, particularly those of Meister Eckhart and of Nicholas of Cusa.
He also took an active interest in Eastern philosophies , particularly Buddhism , and developed the theory of an Axial Age , a period of substantial philosophical and religious development.
Jaspers also entered public debates with Rudolf Bultmann , wherein Jaspers roundly criticized Bultmann's " demythologizing " of Christianity.
Jaspers wrote extensively on the threat to human freedom posed by modern science and modern economic and political institutions.
After the war he resumed his teaching position, and in his work The Question of German Guilt he unabashedly examined the culpability of Germany as a whole in the atrocities of Hitler 's Third Reich.
To forget it is guilt. It must be continually remembered. It was possible for this to happen, and it remains possible for it to happen again at any minute.
Only in knowledge can it be prevented. Jaspers' major works, lengthy and detailed, can seem daunting in their complexity.
However, he also wrote shorter works, most notably, Philosophy is for Everyman. The two major proponents of phenomenological hermeneutics , namely Paul Ricoeur a student of Jaspers and Hans-Georg Gadamer Jaspers' successor at Heidelberg , both display Jaspers' influence in their works.
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